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1.0 Introduction 
The variety of texts and methods espoused in introductory courses concerned with argument 
is striking.  Clearly part of the diversity is simply a result of the variety of explicitly 
acknowledged goals--is it a logic course? a practical logic course? a critical thinking course? a 
critical reasoning course? an argumentation course? a theory of entailment course?  However, 
even for those who share a reasonably common purpose there still appear to be a variety of 
approaches.   
For anyone familiar with the philosophy of science literature of the last forty years the idea 
of a variety of competing positions can’t help but evoke thoughts of Kuhn’s Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions and make one wonder whether the type of view espoused by Kuhn might 
not have something useful to say about informal logic. Some fairly obvious formulaic questions 
one might ask about “informal logic” based on Kuhn’s conception of science include: 
1) Because of the proliferation of texts and approaches is informal logic in a pre-
paradigmatic state? 
2) Do the various approaches to informal logic each satisfy conditions to be 
paradigms? 
3) Is the development of informal logic a revolutionary paradigm shift? What 
explains so many different approaches? 
Although doing the work to provide justified answers to each of these questions might 
provide a way to sort through and organize one’s understanding about informal logic, I don’t 
believe that the answers to any of these questions are especially informative or useful. 
Besides the multiplicity of approaches there are other reasons to consider the possibility that 
there might be Kuhnian insights for informal logic.   There are analogous aspects of informal 
logic and science that motivate the questions I wish to consider.  Both science and informal logic 
seem to deal with complex ambiguous situations--natural phenomena in the case of science and 
ordinary discourse in the case of informal logic. Both attempt to provide descriptions or 
reconstructions of the phenomena with which they are dealing.  These reconstructions are 
idealizations of the natural phenomena with which they deal.  With these reconstructions various 
techniques can be brought to bear to explain and predict in the case of science and evaluate in the 
case of informal logic.  Each wants to transmit both substantive claims and skills.  Illustrations 
and examples play a role in both of these processes.   I believe that these analogies open the door 
for the Kuhnian conception of knowledge in science to provide some interesting avenues to 
explore in the case of informal logic.  
Doing so requires providing both a characterization of my understanding of the tasks and 
presuppositions of informal logic and, since Kuhn has tended to mean all things to all people,  a 
quick rendition of my interpretation of Kuhn before exploring the possibilities. It is to these tasks 
that I turn in the next two sections. 
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2.0 Informal Logic – Goals, Concept of an Argument, and Context 
2.1 Goals 
There are linguistic, anthropomorphic, psychological, and rhetorical accounts of argument.  I 
take the first three to be descriptive and the rhetorical account to utilize a criterion of persuasion 
rather than an account that is centered around standards of reasonableness.  For the purposes of 
this paper I am going to consider accounts of argument that provide normative accounts centered 
around explications of reasonableness. 
“Informal logic” or “critical thinking” courses usually have the intent of being “practical” 
courses, i.e., attempting to teach a useful set of skills rather than examining the theory of 
argument. The skills are meant to be applicable to ordinary discourse.   I believe that for an 
informal logic course there is a fairly common understanding of the objectives when they are 
stated abstractly enough.  The goals usually include having the students learn to do the 
following: 
1) ascertain whether there is an argument; 
2) identify the argument(s) by: 
a. determining the appropriate schematization (form/structure) which 
applies to the argument(s); 
b. making clear what claims are being made; 
c. ascertaining  the relationship intended between premises and conclusion 
in the argument(s); 
3) evaluate the argument(s).  
Sub-goals are frequently cited with respect to these tasks, e.g., reading with comprehension 
and transforming and comparing language.  
These tasks of informal logic--finding and evaluating arguments--require knowing what an 
argument is and since the arguments occur in the context of ordinary discourse having criteria 
and techniques for identifying arguments in that environment. 
2.2 Concept of Argument 
A culling from a number of introductory texts provides the following suggested 
relationships for identifying when a passage contains an argument. 
• offer evidence 
• provide reasons 
• render acceptable 
• rationally persuade that the conclusion is true 
• rationally persuade that the conclusion is reasonably acceptable 
• make a claim seem more believable because of a cogent connection between that claim 
and the claim cited as its support 
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• the conclusion, is affirmed on the basis of the others 
• the premises  are asserted as support or evidence for the conclusion 
• claimed to follow from the others 
• providing evidence for the truth of that one 
However, virtually all, if not all, of these relationships are subject to a variety of 
interpretations–what counts as evidence? what counts as being a reason?--and these relationships 
do not provide criteria for judging whether an argument is “good”.  Consequently more 
expansive accounts of argument, provided either explicitly or implicitly, follow these initial 
suggestions. 
A basic theory of argument needs to make a number of claims: (i) an ontological claim, i.e., 
what an argument is; (ii) an evaluative claim, i.e., what a good argument is; (iii) a claim about 
the relationship between the theory of argument and ordinary discourse, i.e., normative or 
descriptive; and (iv) a claim about the relationship of the theory to the improvement of 
argumentative skills with respect to either the production or evaluation of argumentation or both. 
There are multiple answers to each of these questions. For example, some different positions 
on what an argument is are: (i) entailment theory--an argument is an intended entailment; (ii) 
dialog theory -- an argument is part of the methodical conduct of a critical discussion between 
parties who are attempting to resolve a difference of opinion; (iii) doubt theory – conclusion 
claim is doubtful or can be made to seem doubtful.   There are also a number of different criteria 
for reasonableness:  (i) logical-–premise/conclusion relationship;  (ii) anthropomorphic-–custom; 
(iii) dialectical–-process. 
This is, of course, vastly over simplistic.  Despite substantial difference among these 
positions I believe that much of what I want to say applies to all without having to discuss the 
differences among them in any detail.   Whether descriptive or normative a theory will postulate 
an idealized structure from which actual discourse deviates in a variety of ways.  The descriptive 
views minimally have to postulate categories so that everything isn’t simply sui generis. 
Descriptive theories want to be able to point out commonalities.  Normative theories are showing 
the way things ideally should be.  In both cases there will be abstracting from ordinary discourse. 
Because of this idealizing and abstraction from ordinary discourse one question that will need to 
be considered is what is involved in applying the theory of argument, whatever it is, to ordinary 
discourse? 
2.3. Context 
There are a variety of parameters potentially involved in an argumentative situation – the 
individuals involved including the arguer as well any individuals functioning as interpreter or 
audience, the situation in which the argumentative discourse occurs, and the argumentative 
discourse itself.  Thus there are a variety of ways in which there can be context dependency -- 
knowledge and intents brought to the situation by the individuals; the situation itself taken 
holistically; the broader environment in which the situation is located.  
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3.0 Kuhn’s View of Science 
Kuhn provides both a characterization of the nature of scientific knowledge and an account 
of the successive stages of scientific development.  It is his characterization of knowledge in 
science in which I am most interested.  One of the key features in Kuhn’s characterization of the 
nature of scientific knowledge is the concept of paradigm.  In his “Postscript -1969" included in 
the second and later editions Kuhn acknowledges his ambiguous utilization of  “paradigm” in the 
original edition indicating that “exemplar”–shared examples--and “disciplinary matrix”– a 
constellation of group commitments--ought to be substituted as appropriate throughout the text.  
Both of these concepts need to be characterized. 
What are the main components of a disciplinary matrix?  The non-exhaustive list of 
components discussed by Kuhn includes: (i) symbolic generalizations; (ii) beliefs in particular 
models; (iii) values; and (iv) exemplars (Kuhn 1996, 181-187). How do paradigms or 
disciplinary matrices control science?  They make substantive claims about what there is and 
how the various entities interact with one another.  They are the source of the methods, problem 
field, and standards of solution accepted by the community. They also play a role in what it is 
that we perceive.  Overall they have both a cognitive and a normative function (Kuhn 1996, 103-
111).  In addition to these functions of disciplinary matrices the characteristics of exemplars are 
also important. 
By “exemplar,” Kuhn means “the concrete puzzle solutions that students encounter from the 
start of their scientific education, whether in laboratories, on examinations, or at the ends of 
chapters in scientific texts. To these shared examples should, however, be added at least some of 
the technical problem-solutions found in the periodical literature that scientists encounter during 
their post-educational research careers and that also show them by example how their job is to be 
done” (Kuhn 1996, 187).   “Close historical investigation of a given specialty at a given time 
discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their conceptual, 
observational and instrumental applications” (Kuhn 1996, 43). 
What is the kind of knowledge resident in exemplars?  “When I speak of knowledge 
embedded in shared exemplars, I am not referring to a mode of knowing that is less systematic or 
less analyzable than knowledge embedded in rules, laws, or criteria of identification.  Instead I 
have in mind a manner of knowing which is misconstrued if reconstructed in terms of rules that 
are first abstracted from exemplars and thereafter function in their stead. Or, to put the point 
differently, when I speak of acquiring from exemplars the ability to recognize a given situation 
as like some and unlike others that one has seen before, I am not suggesting a process that is not 
potentially fully explicable in terms of neuro-cerebral mechanism. Instead I am claiming that the 
explication will not, by its nature, answer the question, ‘Similar with respect to what?’  That 
question is a request for a rule, in this case for the criteria by which particular situations are 
grouped into similarity sets, and I am arguing that the temptation to seek criteria (or at least a full 
set) should be resisted in this case.  It is not, however, system but a particular sort of system that 
I am opposing” (Kuhn 1996, 192). 
How is the practice of normal science carried out?  “The practice of normal science depends 
on the ability, acquired from exemplars, to group objects and situations into similarity sets which 
are primitive in the sense that the grouping is done without an answer to the question, ‘Similar 
with respect to what?’ One central aspect of any revolution is, then, that some of the similarity 
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relations change. Objects that were grouped in the same set before are grouped in different ones 
afterward and vice-versa” (Kuhn 1996, 200).   
Another aspect of Kuhn’s view is that normal science is puzzle solving.  For Kuhn 
characteristics of puzzles include: “ that special category of problems that can serve to test 
ingenuity or skill in solution” (Kuhn 1996, 36);  “intrinsic value is no criterion for a puzzle, the 
assured existence of a solution is” (Kuhn 1996, 37);  “There must also be rules that limit both the 
nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained” (Kuhn 1996, 38). 
To summarize what I take to be the salient aspects of Kuhn’s position for possible insights 
in informal logic: relevancy, structural relationships, and perceptual importance are dependent on 
the assumptions of the disciplinary matrix (theory); and both the application of knowledge and 
teaching are crucially bound up in exemplars instead of being rule-governed activities. 
On the basis of these views about the situation in informal logic and Kuhn’s views the 
following questions arise: 
1) What are the dependencies encountered in informal logic? What aspects of 
informal logic are theory dependent? 
2) Is there a role for exemplars in informal logic? 
4.0 Context and Theory Dependencies in Informal Logic 
There are clearly aspects of understanding what claims are being made in ordinary discourse 
that are not dependent on having a concept of argument. Examples include instances of 
ambiguity and vagueness.  This is not to say that understanding these aspects of ordinary 
discourse is not an important aspect of argument evaluation, but merely that recognizing that 
they are occurring and resolving them doesn’t require a prior concept of argument. However, 
context dependency is certainly generally acknowledged.  Certain aspects of theory dependence 
also are widely accepted.  That the theory you are deploying informs you what the parameters to 
pay attention to is one of those aspects.  
4.1. Context Matters 
The various theories of argument differ in the extent to which context plays a role. One 
might be tempted to believe that the view that entailments are arguments eliminates the need to 
consider context, but even this view has a certain context dependence.  What are the criteria for 
ascertaining that there is an argument on the entailment theory?  I don’t believe that every 
possible entailment whether intended or not is likely to count as an argument. Moreover, the test 
cannot be that there is an entailment because the possibility that the argument is a bad argument 
needs to remain open when determining whether there is an argument.  So when logically correct 
entailment and good argument are considered to be identical there still needs to be some separate 
grounds, such as intent, for determining that an argument is present. 
In contrast some of the other positions explicitly acknowledge that not all intended 
entailments function as arguments and utilize contextual aspects to distinguish between 
arguments and other linguistic entities that rely on entailments, e.g., explanation.  Explanation 
starts with a claim known to be true and attempts to determine the appropriate claims that would 
entail it.  Simply being entailed is not sufficient to count as an explanation or count as a “good” 
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explanation. Mathematics is an interesting case in which the same entailment can function as 
both an argument or proof for a claim as well as explanation as to why it is true.  However, 
elsewhere, lack of context may make it unclear whether one is dealing with an argument and or 
an explanation. 
In fall semester Bill, who is the quarterback on the football team, is the best player on the 
team.  It is also known that he attended a high school sports camp during the prior summer and 
was the only player who did.  Is he the best football player on the team because he attended the 
summer sports camp--an argument or did he attend the sports camp because he was the best 
football player--an explanation?  It depends on what you take the situation to be. If your concern 
is to convince someone he is the best player, then you are providing the argument.  However, if it 
is agreed that Bill is the best player, then you are providing an explanation. 
There are other ways in which context matters.  Background knowledge, judgment, and 
discretion are relevant to argument interpretation as are social and dialectical contexts.  Even 
one’s assessment of the truth of the premises depends on what one knows. 
4.2. Theory Makes a Difference 
There are examples where the theory of argument you hold does make a difference.  What 
will be identified as an argument differs according to the view of argument held.  If an intended 
entailment is identified as an argument, then there are clearly valid deductive entailments which 
will be identified as arguments, e.g., addition, conjunction, or repetition 
 
P   P  P 
PvQ   Q  P 
    P&Q 
 
However, most individuals not schooled in formal logic are generally reluctant to consider 
these as arguments and they would be rejected by numerous non-entailment theories of 
argument. 
It is also the case that evaluation criteria adequate for ensuring that we have a “good” 
argument also depend on the theory adopted.  As an example, consider the following argument: 
All males who take birth control pills will not become pregnant. 
John Jones is a male who takes birth control pills. 
John Jones will not become pregnant. 
This argument satisfies the deductive criterion of logical correctness--the truth of the premises is 
sufficient to guarantee the truth of the conclusion, e.g., it is a good entailment. The argument also 
has true premises: the first premise is an empirical truth and, since John Jones is my creation, I 
can give him whatever odd chemical dependencies I choose.  Consequently, the argument 
satisfies both of the standards--deductively validity and soundness--customarily given by those 
who espouse an entailment theory. However, the customary intuitive reaction is that this not a  
“good” argument.  
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In this particular case the way in which the argument goes awry is fairly clear.  We believe 
that being placed in the category of being male is sufficient to guarantee that the individual will 
not become pregnant.  Consequently, we believe that a stronger argument would be:  
All males will not become pregnant. 
John Jones is a male. 
John Jones will not become pregnant. 
In this case our background information informs us that the original argument was not utilizing 
the best reference class. Ultimately we are not only looking for an argument which is logically 
correct and has true premises, but one which we regard as the strongest argument available for 
the conclusion.  Entailment theorists could add a strength requirement to cover this situation, but 
it is not part of the usually enunciated standards on that view whereas such a requirement is an 
integral part of some of the alternative views. 
4.3. Underdetermination by Evidence, Context, and Theory 
While theory and context play critical roles in determining whether we have an argument 
and if the argument is “good” the claim being made is not that knowing both theory and context 
will always make clear how to interpret and evaluate a passage. 
A frequently occurring situation is one in which what is in common between two specific 
entities is what is at issue--one way to deal with this situation is to generalize on the basis of the 
initial case and then show that the second case falls under that generalization.  A second way is 
to construct an argument by analogy between the two specific situations.  In the first case one is 
constructing an abductive argument and in the second an argument by analogy.   Consider the 
following situation: 
It is wrong for a doctor to lie to a person about a test result, even if the doctor thinks that 
lying is in the patient's best interest. We know this because even doctors would agree that it 
would be wrong for a financial adviser to lie to them about a potential investment, even if 
the financial adviser thinks that this lie is in the doctor's best interest. 
An analogical interpretation would be: 
A financial adviser lies to a client when he thinks doing so is in the client's best 
interest. 
A doctor lies to a patient when she thinks doing so is in the patient's best interest. 
Both are professionals dealing with a client. 
The financial adviser is morally wrong. 
============================================================ 
The doctor is morally wrong. 
An alternative interpretation of the argument is that it abduces a general rule about lying 
from the example of the financial adviser and then uses this general rule to apply to the case of 
the doctor. The argument starts from the view that we would all agree that it is wrong for a 
financial adviser to lie to any customer on the ground that the financial adviser believes lying is 
in the interest of the customer. There is an implicit general rule that supports this view - that 
professionals should tell clients the truth and allow them to determine what is in their best 
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interest. Once this general rule is abduced from the case of the financial adviser, it can be applied 
to the case of the doctor and shown that it is wrong for doctors to lie to patients. 
It is wrong for a financial adviser to lie to a client when he believes it is the best interest 
        of the client 
=============================================================== 
Professionals should tell clients the truth and allow them to determine what is in their 
best interest  
A doctor is a professional.                                                                                                                                   
It is wrong for a doctor to lie to a patient when she believes it is in the best 
interest of the patient. 
 
Here we have a serial argument or an argument chain where the conclusion of the abduction is 
also utilized as a premise in the second deductively valid argument. This example obviously 
presents an overly simplistic instance of the issue of professionals lying to clients. 
In both science and ethics both argument strategies are utilized.  In science the abductive 
form is generally favored when both of the phenomena being considered are natural phenomena, 
but the analogical version occurs when natural phenomena and models of them are being 
considered.  Here there is a difference in context. In the assessment of two acts in ethics there is 
not such an obvious difference in context to help determine the favored interpretation. 
5.0.  Reading with Comprehension 
The argumentation found in ordinary discourse can range from the simple and straight 
forward to extraordinarily complex.  Rarely is an argument in all of its complexity apparent 
merely on inspection or an initial reading.  Usually arguments need to be reconstructed. To 
achieve this one needs to read the passage with comprehension.  What is involved in argument 
reconstruction and reading with comprehension? 
Understanding the substantive claims can be context dependent in the sense that not all of 
the required information is provided explicitly in the substantive claim being considered, but can 
be obtained more indirectly from the context.  For example, the utilization of context to 
determine the referent of indexical words or to eliminate the omnipresent potential ambiguity 
because words have more than a single meaning. This appears to be independent of both theory 
and purpose. 
Separating argumentative discourse from other types is a component of identifying 
arguments. Partly this is done by recognizing the different functions of the sentences.  Different 
possible functions of sentences are relevant. These include: (i) make an assertion; (ii) 
interrogative function; (iii) directive function; (iv) request function; (v) rhetorical function;  (vi) 
performative function; and (vii) a persuasive function. Many of these functions could be further 
broken down.  For example, an assertion could be a description or a comparison.  However, 
recognizing that an argument is present requires more than just understanding the substantive 
claims. It also requires making a judgment about the existence of a relationship. 
There are undoubtedly cases in which all would agree that an argument is present.  
However, as we have seen, both the theory of argument held and the contextual elements of the 
discourse in which the argument candidate occurs can be relevant factors in determining whether 
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an actual argument is present.  Interpretation and comprehension of a passage appear to depend 
on both the fact that one is attempting to identify argumentative discourse and the theory of 
argument held. 
Because it is comprehension for a purpose, factors relevant to that purpose assume a greater 
weight in the process.  It is the theories relevant to achieving that purpose which inform us what 
those factors are.  In informal logic the purpose is the reconstruction of arguments and their 
evaluation.  Thus any parameters associated with argument identification and structure become 
relevant to comprehension.  In this situation determination of the significant aspects of context 
are theory dependent--the theory tells you what aspects of the situation or context you need to 
pay particular attention to. 
Arguments are constituted of various components, e.g., claims, structures, etc.  What are the 
relationships between these various components?  There are several approaches a theory of 
argument might take--a compositional/component approach or a more contextual/holistic 
approach.  On the compositional approach each component is regarded as capable of relatively 
independent treatment while on the other components need to be treated in relationship to one 
another as well as the overall context in which they occur.  On the first view reading with 
comprehension is the understanding of the basic substantive claims being made in the passage, 
which occurs independently of argument structure and evaluation.  Understanding some of the 
claims may be context dependent, but is not seriously theory dependent.  The second 
interpretation makes understanding the argumentative structure as well as the evaluation of 
argument candidates an inherent component of basic comprehension of the passage.  
Looking at serial compound arguments supports the claim that overall argument structure 
can affect the interpretation or comprehension of a claim. For example, argument structure could 
have an impact on how to interpret a sentence as simple as “X’s are Y’s” where no quantifer is 
present.  
Some M are Y. 
All M are X. 
X are Y 
All Z are X. 
All Z are Y. 
 
The first single argument suggests that the particular interpretation would be preferred in order to 
make that argument form valid. However, a universal interpretation is what would make the 
second single argument deductively valid.  Which way should it be interpreted?  The argument 
structure as well as contextual clues are relevant. 
It appears that reading with comprehension for the purpose of argument reconstruction can, 
at most, be theory independent at the level of understanding substantive claims, but even that is 
not always the case.  Reading with comprehension is theory dependent in a fundamental way.   
If this claim is accepted, what are the implications for the presentation order of material in 
textbooks and courses?  Some possible initial suggestions: early introduction of arguments and a 
sense of what is involved in desirable premise/conclusion relationships rather than starting with 
getting clear on substantive claims seems desirable; anything which encourages a piecemeal 
approach should be avoided; courses using different approaches could be designed and then 
assessed for effectiveness; reviewing texts to see how they deal with this issue could be 
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informative.  However, these are simply preliminary thoughts which would need to be worked 
through in more detail.  
6.0. Reconstruction 
There are numerous steps involved in reconstruction: (i) understanding the substantive 
claims made in the passage; (ii) identifying whether an argument is present; (iii) paraphrasing to 
achieve an argument in “standard logical form”.   This last is itself a complex process involving: 
(i) clarification; (ii) elimination of vagueness; (iii) elimination of redundancy; (iv) elimination of 
irrelevancy; (v) elimination of stylistic variation; (vi) ascertaining the contributions of context; 
(vii) supplying missing claims; and (viii) showing structure. The result is an abstracted and 
idealized structure and not what is usually directly encountered in ordinary discourse. 
Accomplishing a reconstruction is a multidimensional problem.  A determination must be 
made that each of the component steps has been satisfied in order to achieve a reconstruction.  
To what extent can rules for this overall process be provided? 
6.1. The Possibility of Rules for Argument Reconstruction 
One might take the question to be whether it would be possible to write a general argument 
recognition and specification computer program: 
“Questions such as these do have answers, but not always uniquely “correct” ones.  
Ordinary language is far too complex for us to be able to write a general argument-
recognition program.  There is no algorithm, or set of precise instructions, by which a 
person or machine, presented with an arbitrary body of actual discourse, can 
mechanically pick out in a finite number of steps just those sequences of sentences that 
are associated with the appropriate claims and thus constitute arguments.” (Blumberg 
1976, 21). 
But there are more liberal construals of “rules” than as algorithms.  In the “Poverty of 
Formalism” Govier has dealt with this issue of whether there are rules for argument 
interpretation.  She considers four sorts of rules; (i) strict formal rules--syntactic and hold 
universally; (ii) strict material rules--non-syntactic but hold universally; (iii) general rules-- hold 
most of the time, but have a ceteris paribus clause; and (iv) rules of thumb--rough guideline for 
action  (Govier 1999, 90).  
Govier argues, and the previous discussion also shows, that any such rules could not hold 
with strict universality.  This eliminates the first two types of rules.  On the other hand rules of 
thumb despite being called “rules” are, at best, indicators.  They lack the systematicity to be true 
rules.  Rejecting them as rules does not mean they are not useful as their frequent inclusion in 
informal logic texts attests.  The plausible candidate is a rule with a ceteris paribus clause. But 
then how do we deal with the application of ceteris paribus clauses? The application of such 
clauses appears to require either an exhaustive listing of the conditions under which the ceteris 
paribus clauses apply or a set of rules is available to govern their application. The exhaustive 
listing presupposes knowing all the situations in which the ceteris paribus clauses are applicable 
– something the inclusion of the clause tacitly acknowledges is not the case. Rules for applying 
rules raise the specter of infinite regress. 
What are the alternatives for systematic guidance in reconstructing arguments? 
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6.2. An Exemplar Approach 
Kuhn’s concept of  “exemplars” as the carrier of cognitive content suggest an alternative 
way to view this situation.  Exemplars represent tacit knowledge.  The knowledge carried by 
exemplars can’t be fully expressed in explicit rules.  Exemplars make classification extensional 
and based on similarity judgments and relationships.  The definition of the concept is implicit in 
its instances; no explicit definition is abstracted.  Consequently, information about correlations of 
features, acceptable feature values, and realizable concept instances is preserved in the instances. 
Not all instances function as exemplars.  This is reflected by the considerable number of 
words for designating specific instances: case; exemplar, example, illustration, model, pattern, 
prototype, exercise.  Their definitions indicate various distinctions among them. Some 
“instances” just fall under the concept--case, example, illustration--but have no special standing. 
Other instances are taken as especially representative or  “ideal”--model, prototype, exemplar, 
archetype.  Specific instances also have various functions: to illustrate; to clarify; to introduce 
new situations or at least new features; and to serve as a model. 
On an exemplar approach there are “worked examples” which represent a variety of 
paradigmatic situations that are encountered with a degree of frequency. New problem situations 
are presented and similarities with previous worked examples are pointed out, various 
adjustments are made to rearrange the new situation to make it more similar to the old or to be 
able to view it as a generalization of the earlier situations, then techniques which worked to 
achieve a solution in those previous cases are utilized.   In informal logic divergent, convergent, 
and linked arguments would each form the bases for a paradigmatic situation with 
generalizations consisting in compound arguments that are combinations of the simpler 
situations. 
In physics the exemplars do not start with complicated situations, but instead rather 
simplistic and stylized ones. Why are stylized examples important?  This allows for the gradual 
introduction of complexity and of the need to deal with large numbers of tasks on a simultaneous 
basis.  My assumption is that doing so is pedagogical useful and that it is psychologically more 
efficacious to learn only one task at a time.   What does this approach say for starting with 
natural language examples? 
What are the advantages of an exemplar approach? Making similarity judgments seems 
teachable in ways that rules of thumb do not.  They are showing the role of the overall situation 
or context in a way that rules of thumb do not.  This could enable one to make better judgments 
about when a rule of thumb applies and when it does not.  It encourages not taking each aspect of 
argument interpretation as a separate step. 
What are issues connected with teaching and learning with exemplars?  Two general 
problems are: (i) what are the strategies to find matching cases and (ii) what is a necessary 
knowledge base of cases and how is it acquired? Sub-questions of the first include:  (i) how are 
cases indexed for efficient retrieval?  (ii) how is the similarity between a new problem and a 
retrieved case assessed? Sub-questions of the second include: (i) how should cases be selected 
for inclusion in the set of exemplars? (ii) how is indexing information learned? (iii) how is 
additional domain knowledge required for the assessment of similarity acquired? (iv) how does 
generalization occur during learning? (Bareiss 1989, 96).  How would students learn from the 
new cases that they attempt to resolve on their own?  Possible learning mechanisms include – 
acquiring new exemplars from situations in which there is no recognition of the relevant 
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similarity; generalizing from partial successes; eliminating candidate cases for inclusion as 
exemplars if they don’t prove useful in new cases. 
The Kuhnian conception of exemplars and their role also suggests that problems provided as 
exercises should be selected in a way to facilitate development of a strong exemplar base.  
Problems need to be viewed not just as an opportunity to practice skills and also transfer skills.  
In informal logic this means not only new situations, but also more complex situations such as 
ordinary discourse.  Questions that might be asked: Provide practice at what? Is it simply 
reconstructing arguments or is it reconstructing arguments under particular circumstances? What 
role does transferability play in problem selection?  How efficacious is it to group exercises 
together that deal primarily a single problem? What is the role for problems that contain little or 
no context?  Is there an optimal way for introducing complicated problems from ordinary 
discourse?  What is an appropriate mix of problems with respect to those that contain good 
arguments and those which deserve criticism? 
7.0 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has attempted to explore and provide support for the following claims: 
1) Exemplars provide a non-rule based method for learning how to put argumentation 
into standard logical form. 
2) A distinction should be made between the two different types of context dependencies 
-- theory independent and theory dependent. 
3) Reading with comprehension for the purpose of argument reconstruction is 
fundamentally a theory dependent activity. 
 
Accepting these claims raises numerous questions to be explored regarding texts, course 
presentation, and teaching strategies for courses in informal logic. 
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